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Introduction 
Starting with the United States in the 1970s, nearly every rich democracy has reformed its 
welfare state to actively promote paid employment (Eichorst & Konle-Seidl 2008). Whether 
labeled active labour market policies, workfare, welfare-to-work, insertion, or activation, these 
interventions have a number of features in common. They tighten the link between welfare 
support and job search, are delivered in part by contracted-out service providers, and are 
underpinned by financial penalties levied against jobless clients for non-compliance. In the 
critical literature the term ‘workfare’ has come to denote the policies and discourses aimed at 
intensifying labour market discipline on workers and job seekers. The intensification of pressure 
on welfare claimants to take low-wage insecure jobs is what we call ‘re-commodification’. 
How welfare reform matters for industrial relations can be seen in the discussion in 
Europe over flexicurity, an alternative policy concept to workfare. Its origins are in Denmark, 
where it was a well-resourced form of labour market intervention governed by representatives of 
the state, capital and organized labour. Policymakers aimed to bridge periods of unemployment 
through generous unemployment benefits and to invest in human capital through training 
(Bredgaard et al 2007). The term was codified in the European Union’s Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs of 2000, which attempted to promote economic competitiveness and growth in 
a way that reconciled prerogatives for both labour market flexibility and strong social rights 
(Gold 2009). Its implementation, however, was impossible in countries without traditions of 
generous social spending and training investment or strong tripartite social partnership 
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arrangements. Even in Denmark, trade unions have been sidelined due to their unwillingness to 
enforce tough work requirements on their members and to service non-members (Larsen 2013).  
More influential was the USA, the laboratory of workfarism, with prototype local 
experiments in the 1970s and 1980s leading to the main piece of national legislation in 1996 
(Peck 2006). Most comparative welfare state assumes that path-dependent characteristics of 
national institutional systems would prevent the rise of workfarism outside of the English-
speaking world (Barbier & Fargion 2004; Esping-Andersen 1999). In the 1990s, however, 
critical writers predicted the spread of workfarist policies internationally as part of a broader 
process of ‘neoliberalization’ in which welfare reforms interacted with broader market-oriented 
policy shifts (Amin 1997; Jessop 1994). The former is consistent with the welfare regimes 
(Esping-Andersen 1990) and Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) schools (Hall & Soskice 2001); and 
the latter with more recent work on dualization (Emmenegger et al 2012) and neoliberalism 
(Baccaro & Howell 2011). A common theme in the latter two strands of literature is institutional 
change (in welfare states and industrial relations) eroding non-market social citizenship rights. 
In this paper we ask how and why workfarist policy mixes emerged and varied. They 
have appeared in a surprising variety of countries, undermining longstanding and well-
established social citizenship rights and introducing a new set of institutions aimed at promoting 
work. Based on a comparison of Germany, Great Britain
i
, and France, however, we find that this 
trend is not universal, and that real-world workfare regimes – combinations of workfarist policies 
and practices covering specific jurisdictions – have varied in surprising ways. Differences, we 
argue, are determined by the use of the market as a public policy governance tool (which 
determines the presence or absence of a workfare regime) and the power of central government 
(which determines the shape the workfare regime takes). We use these factors to explain why the 
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British regime is dominated by large firms including multinational corporations (MNCs) and 
increasingly reliant on non-market forms of state coercion on job seekers; why its German 
counterpart is dominated by local public-sector managers and employs more market discipline in 
dealings with contractors and job seekers; and why France’s version of workfarism has stalled.  
This paper first presents our argument building on a discussion of what workfarism is, as 
well as insights about it from the critical and comparative-institutional schools. Then it provides 
an overview of the country cases, constructed from academic and evaluation research, policy 
documents, and our own field research in the three countries. Between 2007 and 2012, we 
interviewed more than 200 policymakers, civil servants, managers at providers, providers 
associations, front-line staff, and worker representatives in the three countries. We conclude with 
comparative analysis and broader implications. 
 
Comparing workfarism 
The use of the welfare state to promote paid work has grave consequences for the world of work 
in nearly every country in the global North. There are semantic obstacles, however, to address 
when discussing workfarism, some of which correspond to real historical differences. According 
to Standing (1999: 313) three broad categories exist of ‘activation’: active labour market policies 
associated with Nordic social democracy; workfare from the USA, the most aggressive form of 
coercive welfare intervention; and welfare-to-work, a specifically British term, part of the post-
1997 New Labour government’s ‘Third Way’ policy agenda, chosen to distance it from the 
harsher American policy mix (Dean 2007). In policy discussions, workfare usually refers to 
particular mandatory labour-market programs in which claimants work in exchange for welfare 
benefits. Following the critical literature, we use the term differently, to characterize a policy 
 5 
mix in which the conditions and sanctions of the benefits system are used systematically to 
enforce the discipline of the labour market.  
According to the critical school of welfare-state studies, workfarist reformers aim to 
change the institutional constitution of the labour market ‘based on the selective 
recommodification of wage labour, the marketization of the labour market’s boundary 
institutions, the activation and socialization of welfare recipients for contingent employment’ 
(Peck 2006; 315). The critical school interprets workfarism as a broader pattern of behavior of 
states under capitalism, which act to mitigate or resolve crises in the system of production by 
using state governance mechanisms to ‘normalize’ the capital relation in times of crisis. A key 
element of this adjustment is the subordination of social policy to the imperatives of a flexible 
and competitive economy (Jessop 2002). These policy changes can be summarized as an 
intensification of conditionality (an increase in the conditions attached to receiving benefits) 
backed up by sanctions (the temporary or permanent withdrawal of welfare benefits) and 
extended to particularly disadvantaged segments of the out-of-work population (beyond the 
short-term unemployed to the long-term and youth unemployed, as well as those previously 
classified as ‘inactive’ due to disability or caring responsibilities). When these elements are 
present in combination they constitute, according to our definition, a workfare ‘regime’. 
Administration and governance are important for any workfare regime, because social 
policy and public management in this area are influenced by the same set of neoliberal ideas, and 
because administrative dynamics determine the effects of the policy on front-line staff, and 
therefore on clients and labour markets. From the late 1970s, policymakers - initially in the 
English-speaking world, but increasingly elsewhere – promoted the idea that state bureaucracies, 
particularly in welfare provision, were wasteful, self-serving and dysfunctional, failing the 
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taxpayer and stifling private enterprise and competitiveness in an emerging hostile global 
economy. What resulted was privatization, intensified performance management, the expansion 
of consumer choice, and a squeeze on spending. These trends were bound up with moves away 
from overall goals of mitigating social inequalities and protecting rights (Clarke and Newman 
1997) and towards using contracts to govern the behavior both of citizens and of public service 
providers (Carney and Ramia 2002). 
The critical literature does acknowledge national variation in this process, in part because 
workfarism is the aggregate of many piecemeal, contradictory and sometimes abortive 
interventions. Though common to many countries, workfarism is not universal and has not 
produced convergence on a uniform set of policies (Jessop 1994; Peck 2006); moreover, 
neoliberalism generally has created within-country institutionalized diversity (Brenner et al 
2010). While this literature produces highly suggestive critiques, it shies away from stating the 
conditions under which a workfare regime emerges. 
The comparative-institutional tradition, by contrast, provides a clear starting point for 
explaining change, focused on national regimes. The welfare regimes literature, for example, 
focuses on differences in welfare state activities and distinguishes between liberal (same 
countries as LMEs), a conservative (Germany and France), and social democratic (the Nordic 
countries) models. Core to this account is a political story of varying degrees of working-class 
mobilization through unions and political parties and the varying cross-class coalitions with 
specific groups of employers that historically resulted. Welfare institutions are seen as products 
of a past political drive for ‘decommodification’, to liberate workers from market pressures, 
rather than as the product of employer preferences. Decommodification is greatest in social 
 7 
democratic regimes, lowest in liberal regimes, and intermediate in conservative regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1990).  
The VoC school proposes a different mechanism to sustain diversity, namely institutional 
complementarity. The assumption is that employers strategically favor particular institutional 
arrangements in areas as wide ranging as the welfare-state, training, industrial relations, and 
corporate governance, because these arrangements contribute to the economic competitiveness of 
the particular national model of capitalism. A welfare state with a strong element of human 
capital investment and generous unemployment benefits, for example, is complementary with the 
high-quality German production model, because it allows large numbers of workers to move 
from job to job without being forced to move into lower-wage lower-skilled jobs (Hall & 
Soskice 2001).  
National-regimes theories argue that the transfer of social or labour market policies 
between regime types is unlikely. This sometimes leads to correct predictions, as in Boyer’s 
(2004) argument that the Lisbon accord would fail, since it was premised on assumptions of 
international ‘best practice’ rather than sober assessment of what is realistic in Europe’s 
variegated institutional and political fabric. However, in the traditional national-regimes form, 
comparative institutionalists wrongly predicted that workfare, and market-making arrangements 
more generally, would be limited to the English-speaking world. In fact, for the theoretically 
crucial case of Germany, there was a wide range of market-making reforms (Streeck 2011), 
reinforced by rapid declines in collective bargaining coverage and union membership (Hassel 
1999), organizational restructuring of large firms (Doellgast 2012), and the rise of a low-wage 
sector larger as a share of the workforce than that of the UK (Bosch and Weinkopf 2008). One of 
these marketizing changes, the Hartz reforms, we will discuss in detail below. These changes 
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have opened the door to critiques of past national-regimes approaches that suggest that 
Europeanization, neoliberal politics, options for institutional escape, and marketization affected 
national institutions in a way that called into question existence of a stable and distinctive 
‘models’ of regulation (Lillie & Greer 2007; Vidal 2013).  
The comparative-institutional tradition has adapted to these new facts in two main ways. 
One, the dualization discussion, combines a picture of path-dependent change and within-
country variation (Palier & Thelen 2010). One core element of this theory remains the same as 
VoC and the welfare regimes literatures: the argument is that it is not market logic that causes 
change, but rather a set of non-market demographic, political, and institutional shifts. Decisive 
for this theory is an alleged political cleavage within the workforce (insiders versus outsiders), 
with the main actor in policymaking a cross-class coalition of unions and employers in the ‘core’ 
large-firm sector. Drawing mainly on the cases of France and Germany, dualization theorists 
argue that change is caused in part by the declining coverage of socially protective institutions 
that presuppose stable employment, such as social insurance, collective bargaining, and 
apprenticeships, as well as an intensification of labour-management cooperation within this core. 
The holders of stable jobs are in this account are self-interested unionized ‘labour market 
insiders’. As this group shrinks, there is an increase in the number of ‘outsiders’, i.e. workers and 
unemployed people cut off from collective worker representation, social insurance, collective 
bargaining, and apprenticeship training because of weak or non-existent ‘labour market 
attachment’. Inequalities between these two groups increase as unions and employers seek 
policies to protect ‘insiders’ in order to maintain productivity and labour peace, the costs of 
which are shifted onto the rest of society. According to this theory, the rollback on non-market 
citizenship entitlements may take place in non-liberal regimes, but they will not produce a break 
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with the historical institutional trajectory in the core of the economy. Within each country there 
is variation, with non-liberal labour market regulations providing insiders with persistent 
protections and privileges and a growing group of outsiders lacking these protections 
(Emmenegger et al 2012).  
The second adaptation of comparative institutionalism concerns liberalization, which 
loosens not only past assumptions of stability, but also those about the character of change as 
path-dependent and (outside the English-speaking world) fundamentally resistant to market 
logic. Höpner et al (2009) provide evidence for a much wider range of liberalization processes 
taking place across this group of countries since the 1980s, including declines in ‘state 
intervention’ not only in the labour market and welfare state, but also through privatization, 
reductions in subsidies, and the deregulation of product and financial markets. Baccaro and 
Howell (2011) find evidence that the overall trend of change in industrial relations across OECD 
countries is liberalizing in two senses: deregulation (the elimination of constraints on capital) and 
conversion (a change in the function of existing institutions to enhance, rather than restrict, the 
discretion of capital). This finding is echoed by Holst (2013) who argues that marketization 
produces shifts in industrial relations in core German workplaces that are greater than the 
dualization literature would suggest. The liberalization literature thus draws attention to a trend 
common across many countries: the decline of established non-market forms of state intervention 
and collective regulation, including those whose purpose it was to redistribute resources or 
protect the vulnerable in the face of markets. 
The institutional theories underpinning comparative industrial relations research have 
thus moved beyond a notion of static national regimes. However, they remain thin in their 
conceptualization of spaces created by the market. In contrast to critical approaches that see 
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neoliberalism as engendering a richly variegated institutional landscape (e.g. Brenner et al 2010), 
the liberalization and dualization literatures define the emerging regulatory landscape in terms of 
the decline of old institutional frameworks rather than the features of some new institutional 
space. This latter space is institutionally thick, as we might expect, not only from the critical 
school, but also from institutionalist discussions of the regulation of privatized and deregulated 
industries (Vogel 1998), prison labour in the US (Western & Beckett 1999), and corporate 
takeover rules (Culpepper 2010).  
The present paper seeks to build this idea – of marketization giving rise to new 
institutionally thick regulatory arrangements – into comparative industrial relations theory 
through an examination of workfarism and its effects at the bottom end of labour markets. We 
argue that in order to understand a country where labour markets have been ‘liberalized’ or a 
stratum of labour market ‘outsiders’ has emerged, it is necessary to understand the institutions 
that emerge in the new marketized setting. This paper examines a particular kind of 
marketization, namely labour recommodification caused by welfare reform. Its implications 
extend beyond those with weak labour market attachment to large swathes of the quasi-
permanent workforce that could potentially move between jobs but for whom state support to do 
so becomes less generous and potentially punitive. We highlight two institutions in public 
administration that enable or shape this process:  
1. The state’s imposition of market relations on its own structure is an important enabler of 
workfarist social policy.  This is consistent with one of the premises of the empirical 
social policy literature, that under workfarism the state is increasingly concerned with 
making and enforcing contracts (both in its approach to jobless clients and contractors) at 
the expense of non-market citizen entitlements (Carney & Ramia 2002). Marketization in 
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public administration is one area where a very wide range of states have considerable 
flexibility; indeed the three pioneers of contracted-out welfare-to-work services were 
Australia, Denmark, and the Netherlands, which represent the full range of welfare 
‘regime types’ (Bredgaard & Larsen 2008). Thus, we hypothesize that the commodifying 
effects of a workfare regime depend to a great extent on the use of market mechanisms in 
public administration. The relative weakness of France’s workfare regime is thus related 
to a broader reluctance by the French state to impose market relations on public service 
provision, even that which is carried out by external contractors. 
2. The power of central government is necessary for a large-scale handover of service 
provision to the private sector and certain kinds of direct state intervention at the bottom 
of the labour market. There is a contradiction between some features of marketization and 
restrictions on central state power, since local politicians, administrators, and social 
partners may resist kinds of marketization that undermine their own power or existing 
practices at the local level. This is consistent with empirical findings on the role of 
federalism and social partnership in slowing change and shaping policy outcomes in 
Germany (Knuth 2009), but largely neglected in the critical and comparative-institutional 
literatures. Thus, we hypothesize that, where other basic conditions for workfarism are 
satisfied, a centralized state unencumbered by a stable division of powers will introduce 
more ‘illiberal’ elements to its workfare regime. In Great Britain, central state power led 
to illiberal policies, including market rules in contracted out services that sought to ensure 
‘commercial viability’ for large providers, as well as various administrative tools to 
ensure a low-wage or no-wage workforce in ways that went far beyond the coercion of 
the labour market. Germany’s workfare regime, by contrast, is more consistent in 
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imposing market relations on external service providers (through rigorously price-based 
contracting) and clients (through the rollback of make-work schemes and refocusing of 
attention on job placements in the ‘first’ labour market).  
 
Workfarism in three countries. 
We have selected Germany, Great Britain, and France partly because of their similarities. They 
are rich democracies with welfare states subject to the strictures and coordinating mechanisms of 
the European Union, with some of the basic features of a workfare regime: 
 a political discourse of enforcing work and fighting welfare dependency, alongside a set 
of policies aimed at reducing entitlements attached to citizenship or making entitlements 
more tightly linked to paid employment; 
 the integration of benefit payment with job search services into a one-stop shop Public 
Employment Service (PES) charged with enforcing conditionality (such as job-seekers 
agreements) and sanctions for non-compliance;  
 a range of active labour market programmes, initiated centrally but with contracted-out 
delivery by for-profit, non-profit, and public-sector bodies; and 
 the targeting of activities on particular geographies that have been identified as having 
acute economic and social problems (e.g. mining and manufacturing regions and certain 
urban areas) and on particular groups in society (e.g. the young, the disabled, lone 
parents, immigrants). 
We have also chosen to compare these countries because of their variation in the degree to which 
workfarism has been implemented. Although comparative welfare regime theory categorizes 
Germany and France as conservative welfare regimes and the UK as liberal, it is Germany and 
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Great Britain that have gone furthest in adopting the workfarist policies. Indeed, even when the 
UK and Germany previously had nominal left-of-center governments, the ‘Third Wayist’ (Corby 
& Symon 2011) orientation of the Blair-Brown and Schroeder governments were not only 
sympathetic to market capitalism (Streeck 2011), but also capable of rolling out pro-business 
policy in increasingly sophisticated ways. France’s reforms, by contrast, fit an overall picture of 
neoliberal change blocked, delayed, limited in scope, restricted to narrow areas of policymaking, 
and ineffectively implemented (Prasad 2007; Levy 2011). While France has adopted some of the 
institutional forms of a workfare regime, there is little sign of a re-commodification effect. 
The following sections describe each country in terms of the shifts in policy towards 
conditionality and sanctioning, as well as the governance of the PES, contracting practices, the 
structure of service provision, and overall recommodification effects on the labour market.  
 
Germany: Workfarism as liberalization  
The Hartz laws, passed in 2003, reformed the welfare state and labour market after decades of 
relatively minor adjustments. The four acts produced a major reduction in the generosity of 
insurance-based unemployment benefits and a severe ratcheting up of pressures on job seekers to 
enter low-wage and non-standard forms of work. They also restructured employment services by 
imposing market discipline on much of the organizational landscape of contracting, through 
procurement for some services and vouchers for others, and by restructuring services within the 
PES. These reforms exacerbated already growing problems in Germany with low-wage insecure 
work and inequality, and there is strong evidence that they had disciplinary effects on the core 
workforce.  
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The most severe change was the reduction of entitlements to unemployment benefits 
pegged to past earnings. What had been for most a much longer-term earnings-related 
entitlement was reduced to one year of unemployment insurance (ALG I), followed by a shift 
into a flat-rate means-tested benefit that could also be used to top up the wages of low earners 
(known as Hartz IV or ALG II). Work requirements were intensified by broadening the 
definition of a ‘reasonable’ job offer whose acceptance by job seekers would be mandatory, 
including jobs with lower pay and occupational skill requirements than the client’s previous job. 
These requirements were introduced alongside the liberalization of temporary agency work and 
mini jobs, and more widespread use of barely remunerated make-work schemes known popularly 
as the one-euro job. Despite low sanctioning rates and high success rates for appeals, the reforms 
successfully undermined the principle of ‘status security’ that had been built into the system 
from its inception (Hassel and Schiller 2010; Klenk et al 2010). Among the effects of Hartz IV is 
its stigmatizing character for its claimants (Dörre et al 2013).  
Under the Hartz regime, there was considerable continuity with the past in terms of 
overall governance of the PES. At the central level, the social security system was administered 
by the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA), with funds collected through payroll deductions as well 
as tax funds, operational autonomy from the responsible ministry, a tripartite governance board 
(albeit weakened by the reforms), and a powerful works council (Personalrat) representing its 
employees. After the reforms and the restructuring that followed, the BA remained Germany’s 
largest public agency in terms of employment. At the local level a division was created between 
the agency that administers the insurance-based unemployment benefit (a local office of the BA) 
and that which administers Hartz IV (which became either a jointly administered agency of the 
BA and the municipality or part of the municipal government). The power of local government 
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in this structure was shored up by a 2007 constitutional court ruling that the initial structure did 
not sufficiently respect the role of local government in providing social assistance and by a 2010 
law in response to that ruling that increased the number of fully municipalized Jobcenters (which 
now account for 20% of spending). With the exception of the latter, the BA retains considerable 
power in part due to its electronic systems, its centralized worker representation structure, and its 
role in restructuring the procurement function.  
The reforms, however, did change the relationship between the PES and contractors. 
Whereas in the past it had been a relationship of delegation and built on a tradition of 
subsidiarity, after the reforms it was governed by market transactions. These changes were 
central to the branding of the reforms, which were known officially as the ‘Laws for modern 
services on the labour market’; this is in part a response to accusations against the predecessor to 
the BA of patronage and corruption, in particular in relation to training providers run by the 
social partners. Exempted from this shift were make-work schemes, which were dominated by 
the non-profit sector and excluded from procurement law. Other activation programs – mainly 
short-term training measures – were subjected to price-based competition organized by new 
organs within the BA known as the regional purchasing centers (the Regionale Einkaufszentren 
or REZen) which gained considerable influence over the actual content of programs. A third 
variant were the placement vouchers and training vouchers, which were issued by BA staff to job 
seekers. Providers could redeem the vouchers if they attracted the job seekers to a training course 
or found them a job. The cumulative effect of these shifts was that the long-term relationships 
that shaped the landscape of service provision were transformed through competition between 
providers and through a new market-mediated relationship between funder and providers (Hipp 
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& Warner 2008). The voucher market is fluid and fast-moving, with transactions that are arms-
length.  
The dominant actors in this system, however, are the local managers of the bodies that 
administer the two unemployment benefits and, increasingly, managers within the procurement 
function. While the statute sets out a series of ‘instruments’ (such as one-euro jobs or different 
kinds of training programs), managers have considerable flexibility as to which instrument to 
use, the design of the services, and the procurement process. Local Jobcenter managers can, for 
example, work with the REZ to procure an off-the-shelf program designed centrally and offered 
to local managers as a ‘product’. Or they can design their own program and procure it through 
the municipal government. In the former case the goal is usually to extract low prices through 
competitive bidding; in the latter case it is often to maintain some existing structure of provision 
through a tendering specification that favors incumbent providers. The landscapes of provision 
that emerge from this process are dominated by local networks of nonprofits and small for-profit 
firms, with short contract cycles and low profit margins. Multinational providers have had little 
success in extracting profits from the German market, and an early attempt by the Dutch 
company Maatwerk to enter the German market led to its insolvency. Small local businesses and 
nonprofits (large and small) dominate the contracting landscape. 
The effect of the Hartz reforms on the German labour market is one of 
recommodification. Policymakers succeeded in disrupting a system that provided ‘status and 
income security for the standard male worker’, weakening the role of social partners in 
governing the system (Hassel & Schiller 2010: 54). One detailed study of Hartz IV claimants 
showed, furthermore, that the new structures reframed unemployment as a competition, with 
periodic tests of eligibility or of meeting work requirements (Dörre et al 2013). The effect for 
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others in the labour market, including many low earners in permanent jobs, is fear of downward 
mobility as a consequence of unemployment (Brinkmann et al 2006). This fear helps to explain 
why, despite the increase in precarious employment of various kinds, labour turnover in the core 
of German industry has actually been decreasing (Knuth 2011). Under this regime, however, the 
more illiberal aspects of workfare remain restricted. One-euro jobs, for example, which were 
illiberal in their conception (a make-work scheme that enforced work using administrative means 
rather than market compulsion), were restricted to ‘social-benefit work’. Funding for these was 
sharply reduced after 2009 due to budget cuts and evaluations finding that they were not 
conducive to successful job placements in the non-subsidized ‘first’ labour market.  
 
Great Britain: Illiberal workfare 
Though Great Britain has taken a slow and incremental approach to reform, the accumulated 
changes made by governments since 1979 have produced a harshly punitive workfare regime. 
The effects of these policies were shaped by the abandonment of any Keynesian consensus for 
full employment in the 1970s, Thatcher’s anti-union laws of the 1980s, and industry 
restructuring. Under the post-1997 New Labour government, there was an expansion both of 
mandatory welfare-to-work schemes and of other incentives to move into work, such as tax 
credits and the national minimum wage. Under the Coalition Government (elected in 2010), 
labour market regulation is losing some of its market-making incentives for job seekers 
introduced by Labour and is taking on new illiberal features (Mabbett 2013). 
In Britain the balance of social rights and obligations was altered beginning in the 1980s 
by changes in conditionality and sanctioning; however, it was easy to exaggerate the speed and 
extent of reform during its early phase. Like Germany prior to the Hartz reforms, for example, 
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there was support for labour market exit for workers made redundant due to industry 
restructuring (funded by the incapacity benefits system rather than the retirement system), which 
along with increasing numbers of people on benefits put a financial strain on the social security 
system. As this structural joblessness endured, especially in regions hit hardest by 
deindustrialization (Marsh & Rhodes 1992), a ‘Stricter Benefits Regime’ for job seekers was 
rolled out in the late 1980s with job seekers’ agreements and mandatory meetings with advisors. 
Mandatory activation programs followed starting in 1996, and then were expanded after 1997. 
Since 2008, work requirements have been extended to large groups of disabled people and lone 
parents once eligible for inactive benefits. In all these programs, the main form of pressure on 
job seekers was the withdrawal of benefits, i.e. the removal of the means to subsist independently 
of the market. These have been reinforced since 2010 by intensified administrative oversight in 
the workplace, with the stated aim of sustaining job placements from the Work Programme, 
increasing hours worked by recipients of tax credits, and (unpaid) ‘mandatory work activity’ to 
enforce the disciplines of work. 
The governance of the PES had a long history of centralization. In Great Britain, 
tripartism in the area of skills provision for the unemployed was abolished in the 1980s with the 
end of the Manpower Services Commission. Jobcentre Plus (JCP) was created in the early New 
Labour years by a merger of two national bodies and placed under the supervision of the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). Centralization tendencies were reinforced by the 
Coalition Government through the abolition of regional bodies funding employment services, 
other funding cuts that undermined provision in local government and the demotion of JCP from 
ostensibly independent ‘Executive Agency’ to a ‘brand’ within the Department for Work and 
Pensions. Internally, JCP is hierarchically organized as well, with strict and detailed targets for 
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local managers, who have very little discretion by local management to design new forms of 
provision, either in-house or outsourced.  
Contracting has also been shifted to the national level (Wiggan 2009). There has been a 
gradual shift since the 1980s from highly diverse and fragmented arrangements, which included 
non-marketized funding for the voluntary sector such as grants (with few strings attached) or 
contracts (with quasi-automatic renewal and payment for ‘bums on seats’ rather than 
performance), but also vouchers and highly competitive price-based forms of contracting. After a 
government-commissioned report by the banker David Freud (2007), the DWP sought to impose 
centralized coordination on this organizational landscape, first by moving the procurement 
function out of local JCP offices into national DWP offices, and then by outsourcing 
procurement to a small number of ‘prime contractors’ that subcontracted a substantial amount of 
their work to a ‘supply chain’. Parallel to the centralization of contracting was a trend to move 
provision of labour market programs into contractors and out of JCP, which had carried out most 
of New Labour’s early New Deals in-house and contracted-out specialist provision. Other 
funders at the sub-national level were abolished (such as England’s Regional Development 
Agencies and Learning and Skills Councils) or experienced severe budget cuts (local 
government).  
The dominant players in the structure of contracted-out service provision are civil 
servants and ministers at the national level who design programs and large firms that manage 
these programs. By far the largest of the Coalition’s initiatives is the Work Programme, which 
has 18 prime contractors, all but 3 of which are for-profit companies. According to the DWP’s 
estimates immediately after commissioning this work, 75% of the volume of this work would be 
managed by multinational for-profit companies, who would subcontract with hundreds of other 
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organizations. 426 subcontractors were charities, 335 subcontractors were for-profit companies, 
and 155 were public sector organizations. Executives of the prime contractors meet regularly 
with ministers and top civil servants to discuss policy in the Work Programme National 
Partnership Forum and constitute the core membership of the sector’s lobbying organization, the 
Employment Related Services Association.
ii
 In place of constitutional principles such as 
subsidiarity or federalism, the relationships between levels of government and between the state 
and civil society are governed as supply chains of for-profit firms. 
Welfare reforms from the 1980s onwards have had a re-commodifying effect on the 
labour market with a distinctly illiberal edge. Despite years of reforms, in the late 1990s the 
intensity of case management remained quite low by international standards with a sanctioning 
regime underpinned by targets playing a far more important role (Considine 2001). The use of 
the welfare state to regulate the labour market reached a new level of institutional sophistication 
under New Labour, which created JCP and large outsourced labour market programs. The 
punishments and supports built into these programs were reinforced by incentives such as tax 
credits and the national minimum wage to increase the dynamism of the labour market (Grover 
2005). The effects of New Labour’s policies are difficult to separate from the boom in overall 
demand due in part to public sector spending, but social rights did become increasingly tied to 
labour market participation, and the welfare-to-work apparatus became far more sophisticated in 
both its incentives and its punishments.  
Under the post-2010 Coalition Government, the illiberal side of labour 
recommodification has come to the fore. The use of labour market programs to shift core 
government functions started under New Labour with the Freud Report (2007) and was ratcheted 
up further by the Coalition. Ministers have focused their rhetoric on the social dysfunction of 
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jobless families and neighborhoods with high levels of unemployment, although this also existed 
to some degree under Labour (Levitas 1998). Like the previous government as well, they have 
continued to ratchet up coercion at a time of weak employer demand and cuts to benefits levels, 
and like past governments their approach includes intensified pressure on the jobless to look for 
work. Perhaps the Coalition’s main innovation is its use of welfare in the workplace. Under the 
Work Programme providers are paid for job placements sustained over two years and have 
therefore taken a role in ensuring that workers remain in their jobs. Under Mandatory Work 
Activity, Work Experience and Sector-based Skills Academies unemployed people are required 
to work for their benefit with no top-up. And under the Universal Credit the government plans to 
convert tax credits into in-work benefits conditional on efforts to increase hours worked. Great 
Britain’s welfare state apparatus is now not only used to increase the supply of low-wage and 
flexible labour available on the market, but also to directly enforce work discipline in 
workplaces. 
 
France: Workfarism stalled 
In France the politics and institutions of workfarism are present, but the substance of labour re-
commodification is lacking. Controlling the social welfare budget and reducing unemployment 
were primary policy aims of the conservative presidents Chirac (1995-2007) and Sarkozy (2007-
2012). Like Germany and Great Britain, France has created contracted-out active labour market 
programs, merged its benefits payment and job search assistance agency, developed a discourse 
of encouraging work and discouraging idleness, and legislated job search requirements formally 
attached to benefit. Yet, reform has stalled at key moments, such as 2002-04, when the Conseil 
d'Etat (highest administrative court) censured the government for reducing benefit entitlements 
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by reforming the job seekers agreements, and the governing party lost the 2004 local elections. 
In general, France lacks the clear lines of authority used in Germany and Great Britain to impose 
market discipline over providers and welfare claimants; professionals and non-profit associations 
retain considerable autonomy in front-line work; and the welfare entitlements attached to French 
citizenship have proven far more resilient. The conservative discourse of ‘declinology’, 
compounded with periodic flashes of serious social unrest among disenfranchised and 
marginalized groups in urban peripheries, have established France’s own particular construction 
of la crise (Powell 2007; 22) or ‘social anesthesia’ (Levy, 2011). 
While there have been policy shifts towards conditionality and sanctioning, these have 
lacked the institutional sophistication seen in Great Britain or Germany and have been 
introduced in the context of much stronger and more persistent welfare entitlements (Barbier and 
Knuth 2010). For example in 1988 a new tax-funded social assistance benefit (Revenue Minimum 
d’Insertion [RMI]) with weak work requirements was introduced for people who fall outside of 
the insurance-based unemployment system; retrenchment in earnings-linked insurance-based 
benefits has been far less drastic than in Germany; and government-funded job placements for 
the unemployed lack the work-for-benefit logic of British workfare and German one-euro jobs. 
Conditionality has been built into the system formally. RMI and its successor Revenu de 
Solidarité active (RSA) included job-seekers agreements, an additional job-seekers agreement 
was introduced in 2001 for people in the insurance-funded system, and the 2008 legislation 
creating the Pôle emploi expanded the definition of a ‘reasonable’ job offer that claimants can be 
required to accept. But, despite these changes – which mirror the broader drift of policymaking 
internationally – it remains questionable whether conditionality and sanctions have been 
implemented.  
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It may be the governance of the PES that is an even more important force frustrating the 
application of sanctions and conditionality. Like the BA, the Pôle emploi manages both benefits 
payment and job placement services and is governed by the social partners and has its own 
funding source, based on social insurance contributions. In 2008, the system of administration of 
social insurance and support for the unemployed was reformed through the merger of the 
ANPE
iii
 (which provided front-line support to the unemployed) into UNÉDIC
iv
 (the agency 
overseen by the Social Partners administering workers’ unemployment insurance) and the 
formation of the Pôle emploi as the PES (Pôle emploi 2011). The intention was to create a 
clearer connection between benefits payments and job-search assistance and to tighten 
conditionality and sanctioning practices. In addition to the bureaucratic restructuring, the Pôle 
emploi was given enhanced capacity to commission direct interventions.  
The central position of the Pôle emploi, however, does not give it anything like exclusive 
governance powers in employment policy; indeed, while it administers insurance-based benefits, 
municipalities are formally responsible for administering RSA and organizing activation 
measures for RSA claimants. The result is a complex organizational network that includes 
regional and local government, as well as national government agencies and their recently 
‘deconcentrated’ operations in the regions and locales. The latter includes, for example, 
DIRECCTE
v, which is a merger of several central government agencies’ regional and local 
operations and combines multiple strands of policy making relating to various aspects of work, 
employment, and labour markets. In addition, associations and private contractors are 
commissioned to deliver complementary services that seek to enable the unemployed to take 
advantage of employment opportunities.  
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French public administration and economic management has historically been thought of 
as statist and dirigiste (Hantrais 1996) in a way that disqualified it from comfortable 
classification as a CME, in VoC parlance. The French system has also, however, for some time 
been characterized by its plurality and diversity of practice, with non-state agencies involved in 
policy implementation and with a trend toward devolution of decision making and priority 
setting to local actors with an aim of fine-tuning implementation to meet local needs. This may 
make sense in coping with the divergent needs, for example of industrial regions facing the 
decline of mining and heavy industry as opposed to the banlieus of Paris, where the most 
pressing social problem is with un- or underemployed youths, principally of North and West 
African origin (Smith 2004). However, this plurality undermined the concept of Pôle emploi as a 
joined up service by engendering a wide range of collective agreements, skill profiles, and 
cultures whose integration proved to be a challenge (Béraud & Eydoux 2009). The Pôle emploi 
project has been frustrated further by a freeze in its budget after 2009 (Clegg and Palier 2013). 
Because of this fragmented structure, contracting in France cannot be used as a lever to 
re-engineer provision and push the jobless into work. Alongside the recent reforms there has 
been more intensive contracting of work to private firms and associations. Although bidding is 
on a competitive basis and there is an element of payment for placement in work or training, both 
commissioning bodies and contractors are clear that contracting of new programs is meant as a 
complement to, rather than replacement of, existing direct state provision. Temporary agencies 
including Manpower and Adecco carry out contracted-out job placement services for the short-
term unemployed, and Ingeus, a multinational firm that is the largest player in the British market, 
also has a strong presence in France. Nonprofit associations work on longstanding contracts with 
specific groups, often in cooperation with a complex web of public agencies. Unlike the 
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marketized parts of the German and British activation landscapes, occupational identities among 
front-line staff in France are resilient (Divay 2008), and in response to lackluster evaluation 
evidence French commissioning bodies have moved to assert more control and reduce flexibility 
in contracting (Fretel 2010). 
In France there is little evidence of a recommodification effect. While the ‘insertion’ 
agenda has evolved in policy discourse towards a principle of using the welfare state to mobilize 
labour and clarifying conditionality rules within welfare administration (Clegg & Palier 2012), 
the labour market effects remain unclear. Labour market liberalization may have emanated from 
other areas of policy, such as liberalization of temporary employment contracts, and not from the 
benefits system. The use of subsidized jobs seems to have had ambivalent effects due in part to 
the fact that these are subsidized jobs rather than work-for-benefit schemes. While they may 
have opened the door for more low-wage and contingent work, subsidized jobs were used only 
for small numbers of RSA claimants (ibid.) and they reduced competitive pressure on the job 
market by increasing employer demand (Caroli et al 2008). Contrary to accounts of French 
dirigisme, therefore, the workfare story is one of limited state capacity, due to a fragmented 
institutional structure that prevents the marketization of state institutions and the 
recommodification on labour. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The cases in comparison 
Table 1 displays the main relevant similarities and differences between the cases. Great Britain’s 
workfare regime has evolved slowly since the 1980s, and since the late 2000s it has been 
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dominated by large firms and governed by complex financial incentives. The German system, by 
contrast, was reformed through a single package of reforms passed in 2003 which significantly 
reduced the decommodifying nature of the unemployment insurance system. It is coordinated by 
local public-sector managers, who use highly marketized forms of contracting to tightly control 
their subcontractors. France’s adoption of workfare has stalled, with significant legislative and 
legal setbacks and a complex and fragmented structure of service provision that resists change 
and restricts labour recommodification. How do we account for these differences? 
A comparison between the cases shows that the market structures imposed by the state as 
a tool for public administration matter for whether workfarist policies translate into labour re-
commodification. In all three countries, policymakers have attempted to impose market relations 
in different ways. They have sought, in line with the constraints of EU open market legislation, 
to address unemployment and the apparent inflexibility of labour markets by contracting out 
certain welfare functions. In Great Britain it has taken the form of the dominance of a few large 
prime contractors who contract directly with central government on a relatively long-term basis 
and manage supply chains of smaller contractors at the regional level on a pay-for-performance 
basis. In Germany it has taken the form of the dominance of local public-sector managers, and 
the assertion of their control over local markets of contractors by relatively short-term contracts 
distributed mainly on the basis of price. For job placement services, externalized work funded by 
vouchers is an extreme case of marketization where there is no payment without a job outcome 
and no contractual relationship between funder and provider. In both cases, contracting creates 
uncertainty for contractors and a strong incentive to conform to objectives prescribed in 
tendering documents by funders which, in various ways, seek to keep them accountable. In 
France, by contrast, there is a multiplicity of funding bodies, with different contracting processes 
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and a highly fragmented and decentralized governance structure. Generally, funding is stable 
enough in France to provide a secure and specialized niche for non-profit providers; this and the 
lack of a central steering agent for activation services makes it impossible for policymakers to 
use the commissioning process as a lever to re-engineer services. Great Britain and Germany 
possess a kind of dual marketization – in public administration and in the labour market – that 
France lacks. 
The power of central government matters in explaining qualitative differences between 
the British and German workfare regimes. In Germany strong constitutional protections for state 
and local government and persistent practices of self-administration of unemployment insurance 
by the social partners limit the degree of penetration of multinational providers in contracting 
markets. Active labour market programs are commissioned at the local level for small packages 
of work with the aid of a procurement agency at a higher, regional level. The result is that for-
profit providers tend to be small, and multinational providers report difficulties in justifying 
investment. In Great Britain, by contrast, the central government, unencumbered by social 
partnership arrangements or a constitutionally anchored division of powers with local or regional 
government, has handed over some core functions of the DWP to MNCs and imposed far more 
draconian controls over claimants both in and out of work. Germany pursued a more consistent 
drive towards marketization that created a liberalizing form of workfarism (aimed at reducing the 
status-securing aspect of the welfare state and the role of social partners in provision), whereas 
Great Britain kept marketization within strict limits (to ensure commercial viability for 
contractors), coupled it with more direct state intervention in the workplace, and imposed more 
direct state control over the lives of claimants both in and out of work. While it is difficult to say 
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whether re-commodification is greater in the UK or Germany, there is a clear qualitative 
difference. 
The critical school captures the overall drift towards workfarism – as opposed to stability 
in conservative welfare states or alternatives such as ‘flexicurity’ – as policy makers become 
increasingly preoccupied with moving the jobless into jobs. Policy makers in all three of our 
cases seek to contract out services and customize policy interventions to meet particular local 
labour market needs. These trends run parallel to a broader trend of a weakening in the kinds of 
human capital investment, high and egalitarian wages for workers, and social partnership 
arrangements analyzed by comparative institutionalism and favored by the Lisbon protocols. 
However, there is significant variation in the extent to which social policy has introduced 
conditionality and sanctions, the governance of the PES, the degree to which contractors take 
over the core work of the public sector, the prevalence of MNCs in the contracting markets, and 
the degree to which contracting is coordinated, centralized, and marketized (open to the private 
sector, arms-length, short-termist, and price-based). These differences mark France out as a 
country that has failed to implement neoliberal-inspired policies. There is also an interesting 
difference between Germany and Great Britain in the kind of coercion exerted, which suggests 
qualitative variations within neoliberalism.  
These differences constitute an important gap in the comparative institutionalist 
literature, namely the characterization of what happens when socially protective welfare and 
industrial relations institutions are rolled back. At issue is not only the emergence of groups with 
weak or no welfare entitlements, collective agreements, or strong statutory protection (as per the 
dualization literature), or the overall rollback of these protections (as per the liberalization 
literature). At issue as well is the changing nature of state intervention in the labour market that 
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constitutes a new regulatory space of neoliberalism, including complex changes to punishments 
and incentives built into benefits and tax systems, as well as the assessment and case 
management of clients and governance of welfare-to-work schemes. These changes can have 
disciplinary effects both on job seekers and job holders, and can have both liberalizing effects 
(more market exposure) and authoritarian tendencies (more direct administrative control). These 
effects on job holders are a blind spot for the dualization discussion, just as these authoritarian 
tendencies are for writers on liberalization. 
 
Conclusion 
Above we have examined the rise of workfare regimes in three countries, including policies to 
roll back social citizenship rights and recommodify the labour of citizens using the 
administrative power of the state. Two features of the administrative apparatus ignored by 
comparative-institutional theories were crucial: the use of market mechanisms in public-service 
delivery determined whether a workfare regime with recommodifying effects really emerged, 
and the power of central government determined whether it took a liberalizing or illiberal form.  
We draw on the critical school to draw attention to these issues neglected in comparative 
industrial relations. The critical literature contains a strong conceptualization of a common trend 
toward workfarism, but without an explanation of variation. The comparative literature theorizes 
variation in trajectories of overall change, but neglects the substance of marketizing regulation 
highlighted by the critical school. The nascent discussion of liberalization by comparative 
institutionalists is a partial exception; it is, however, much stronger in discussing disorganization 
and deregulation than it is in capturing the institutions that emerge to shape, govern, and enforce 
market relations in micro-level practice.  
 30 
Industrial relations scholars interested in market-driven change still have much to learn 
from critical students of welfare states, especially when it comes to the illiberal side of welfare 
reform. The UK’s Coalition Government is using welfare reform to intervene in new ways in 
work and employment, both paid and unpaid, including pressures on workers in low-wage 
workplaces through mandatory unpaid job placements and in-work conditionality. While these 
policies could not have been implemented without techniques developed through earlier rounds 
marketizing reforms, they are far from a ‘free-market’ intervention. More research on employers 
and job seekers is needed to understand the effects of these policies and to explore the 
authoritarian aspects of state intervention in so-called liberal regimes. 
We have grounded our argument in three national cases, which is admittedly a small 
sample size. However, there is no comparative dataset that would allow us to compare workfare 
regimes and their outcomes across a larger number of countries; given the state of the data, even 
a rigorous within-country longitudinal study assessing these effects would be a challenge. With a 
dataset capturing the institutional changes discussed above in more countries and over time, we 
could assess with more precision the extent to which a country’s degree of workfarism co-varies 
with other national characteristics such as inequality, insecurity, and other aspects of wellbeing 
and job quality. Our comparison allows us to make a strong case for a causal relationship 
between workfarist reforms and these outcomes, but this is not an issue that has been studied 
using larger comparative longitudinal datasets.  
Social scientists have yet to discover how workfarist policy and politics have changed the 
behavior of job seekers or employers. A fine-grained comparative-institutional analysis is needed 
to understand the pressures that these shifts have put on benefits claimants to force them into 
paid work and the effects of these pressures. More work along these lines may conclude that the 
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political and administrative paralysis observed in France has produced a superior outcome – 
lower levels of inequality – compared to the welfare-reform ‘success stories’ of Great Britain and 
Germany. 
 
 
Notes
                                                        
i
 Our analysis does not include Northern Ireland, where social security is a devolved matter, and where the 
Executive has considerable flexibility in implementing legislation from the Westminster Parliament (Wiggan 
2012). 
ii
 Lists of contractors are available on the DWP website, as are minutes from the Work Programme National 
Partnership Forum, and ERSA publishes a full membership list on its website. 
iii
 ANPE stands for ‘Agence Nationale pour l'Emploi‘. 
iv
 UNÉDIC stands for ‘Union nationale interprofessionnelle pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce‘. 
v
 DIRECCTE stands for ‘directions régionales des entreprises, de la concurrence, de la consommation, du 
travail et de l'emploi’ 
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Table 1: Workfarism in France, Germany and Great Britain 
 France Germany Great Britain 
Conditionality and 
sanctioning 
Minimalist, despite 
government rhetoric 
2003-5 overhaul and 
intensification through 
the Hartz reforms by a 
centre-left government 
Far-reaching 
incremental reforms by 
every gov’t since 1979 
Public Employment  
Service  
(year founded) 
Pôle emploi 
(2008) 
Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit and local 
Jobcenters (2004) 
Jobcentre Plus 
(2002) 
Governance of 
PES 
Insurance funding. Roles for social partners and 
local government, though stronger in France than in 
Germany 
National executive 
agency, since 2011 a 
‘brand’. 
Functions of contractors Specialized, designed as complement to public 
provision 
End-to-end, 
displacement of public 
provision 
Contracting structure Local/regional, 
fragmented 
Local/regional, 
coordinated 
National, centralized 
Prevalence of MNCs Medium Low High 
Marketization of 
contracting 
Low High Medium 
Labour market 
recommodification 
Low High – liberalizing High – illiberal 
 
